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China: Retrospect and ProspectDOCUMENTS
JUN
DEPARTMENT
SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD

During 1967 private contributions to the University
of Montana Foundation established the Maureen and
Mike Mansfield Endowment to honor Montana's
senior senator, an alumnus and professor-on-leave
from the University. The Mansfield Lectures on
International Relations will bring authorities on
foreign affairs to the campus for public lectures,
student seminars and discussions. On March 29, 1968
Senator Mansfield initiated the serie~ with this
lecture.
Viet Nam is heavy on the heart of the nation. The
Vietnamese war is a tragedy. It is a tragedy in the
American lives which it claims. It is a tragedy in the
death and devastation which, in the name of salvation, it has spread throughout Viet Nam.
My views on United States policy respectingcViet
Nam are no secret. I have stated them, restated them,
and elaborated them many times. I have cautioned
against an ever-deepening military involvement in
that conflict. I am opposed to any increase in it today. I believe that the way out of a barbarous situation is not to go further into it.
The first step towards peace, in my judgment, is to
concentrate and consolidate the United States military effort and to escalate the peace effort, looking
towards the negotiation of an honorable end of the
conflict.
That, in brief, is the way I feel about Viet Nam.
That is the way I have felt about it for a long time.
The President knows it. The Senate knows it. Montana knows it.
What I have to say to you, today, touches only
indirectly on Viet Nam. My remarks are intended to
go beyond Viet Nam to what may well be the roots
of the war. In this first lecture of the series on
international affairs, I wish to address your attention
to what is the great void in the foreign relations of
this nation-to the question of China.
As a nation, we have lived through a generation
in only hearsay association with a third of the entire
human race. At the inception of this void, we were
engaged in a costly and indecisive conflict in Koreaon China's northeast frontier. Two decades later, we
are engaged once again in a costly and indecisive
conflict, this time on China's southeast frontier.
These two great military involvements on the Chinese periphery are not unrelated to the absence of

relevant contact between China and the United
States.
Sooner or later a tenuous truce may be achieved in
Viet Nam even as a truce was achieved in Korea. In
my judgment, however, there will be no durable
peace in Korea, Viet Nam or anywhere else in Asia
unless there is a candid confrontation with the problems of the Sino-United States relationship.
China needs peace if the potentials of its cultures
are to be realized. This nation needs peace for the
same reason. In this day and age, the world needs
peace for civilized survival. You young people have
the greatest stake in peace. For that reason, I ask you
to look beyond Viet Nam, behind Korea, to what may
well be the core of the failure of peace in Asia-to
the United States-Chinese estrangement of two
decades.
In 1784, Robert Morris, a signer of the Declaration
of Independence, sent the first American clipper ship
to trade with China. The year that President George
Washington took the oath of office, 1789, fourteen
American ships were riding at anchor in the Pearl
River off Canton in South China.
There are no American ships in Chinese ports today. There have not been for almost twenty years.
In twenty years, hardly an American doctor, scientist, businessman, journalist, student, or even a
tourist has set foot in China.
Across the Pacific Ocean, we and the Chinese
glare at one another uncomprehendingly, apprehensively and suspiciously. In the United States, there
is fear of the sudden march of Chinese armies into
Southeast Asia. In China, there is fear of a tighter
American encirclement and American nuclear attack.
We see millions of Chinese soldiers poised on
China's frontiers. We see leaders who threaten in a
most violent way. We see an internal Chinese turmoil to confirm our fears of irrationality and recklessness. Finally, we see a growing nuclear power,
with the looming spectre of a full-fledged Chinese
intercontinental ballistic missile force.
On the other hand, the Chinese see themselves
surrounded by massive American military power.
They see United States naval, ground, and air bases
scattered through Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Okinawa,
Guam, the Philippines, and Thailand. They see over
half a million American troops in neighboring Viet
Nam and hundreds of thousands more nearby. They

see tremendous nuclear capability with missiles
zeroed in on Chinese cities. They see the United
States as "occupying" the Chinese island of Taiwan
and supporting a Chinese government whose declared aim is the recapture of the mainland. And they
see, too, what they describe as a growing collusion
between the United States and the Soviet Union, a
country which they believe infringes China's borders,
threatens to corrupt the Chinese revolution and exercises an unwelcome influence throughout Asia.

Shifting Attitudes
We and the Chinese have not always looked at one
another with such baleful mistrust. The American
images of China have fluctuated and shifted in an
almost cyclical way. There has been the image of the
China of wisdom, intelligence, industry, piety,
stoicism, and strength. This is the China of Marco
Polo, Pearl Buck, Charlie Chan, and heroic resistance
to the Japanese during World War IL
On the other hand, there has been the image of
the China of cruelty, barbarism, violence, and faceless hordes. This is the China of drum-head trials,
summary executions, Fu Manchu, the Boxer Rebellion-the China that is summed up in the phrase
"yellow peril."
Throughout our history, these two images have
alternated, with first one predominant and then the
other. In the eighteenth century, we looked up to
China as an ancient civilization-superior in many
aspects of technology, culture and social order and
surrounded by an air of splendid mystery. Respect
turned to contempt, however, with China's quick
defeat by the British in the Opium War of 1840. There
followed acts of humiliation of China such as participation in extra-territorial treaty rights and the
Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882.
Attitudes shifted again in the early twentieth century to one of benevolence largely in consequence of
the influence of missionaries. There were more missionaries in China from the United States than from
any other country. More American missionaries
served in China than anywhere else in the world. The
Chinese became, for this nation, a guided, guarded
and adored people.
Chinese resistance to the Japanese invasion in 1937
produced another shift from benevolence to admiration. At the end of the Second World War, admiration was displaced by disappointment and frustration, as the wartime truce between Nationalist and
Communist forces collapsed in cataclysmic internal
strife. This nation became profoundly disenchanted
with China, a disenchantment which was replaced
abruptly in 1949 by hostility.
The hostility was largely a reaction, of course, to
the coming to power of a Communist regime on the
Chinese mainland. We did not interpret this event
as a consequence of the massive difficulties and the
vast inner weaknesses of a war-torn China. Rather,
we saw it almost as an affront to this nation. We
saw it as a treacherous extension of the Soviet steamroller policies which had reduced Eastern and Cen-

tral Europe to subservience at the end of World War
IL
Then, in 1948, came a Communist coup in Czechoslovakia and the Soviet attempt to blockade Berlin.
The triumph of a Communist government in China
followed immediately after these events in Europe.
The nation was shaken to its fingertips.
Still, the press of events continued relentlessly. In
June 1950, the North Koreans launched a sudden
attack on South Korea. The Chinese forces intervened in the war in November of that year. The
United States was brought into a major military
confrontation in which, for the first time, the Chinese
were enemies and not allies.

American Policy Assumptions
After these events, the assumptions of American
policy towards China were revised. An effort was
made to meet both the concern and outrage respecting China which existed in this nation and the revolutionary militancy of the new Chinese regime in
Asia. Policy was cast anew on the premise that the
government on the Chinese mainland was an aggressor which, subject to directions from Moscow, would
use force to impose international Communism on
Asia. Conversely, it was assumed that if the endorsement of the free nations were witheld, this regime
which was said to be "alien" to the Chinese peoplesome sort of overgrown puppet of Moscow-would
wither and eventually collapse.
On this basis, recognition was not extended to
Peking. The official view was that the National
Government, which had retreated to the island of
Taiwan, continued to speak for all of China. We cut
off all trade with the mainland and did what could be
done to encourage other countries to follow suit. In
a similar fashion, we led a diplomatic campaign year
after year against the seating of the Chinese People's
Republic in the United Nations. We drew an arc of
military alliances on the seaward side of China and
undergirded them with the deployment of massive
American military power in bases throughout the
Western Pacific.
Much has happened to call into question the assumptions in which these policies towards China
have been rooted. In the first place, the People's
Republic has shown itself to be neither a part of a
Communist monolith nor a carbon copy of Soviet
Russia. The fact is that, of .the numerous divisions
which have arisen within the Communist world, the
differences between Moscow and Peking have been
the most significant. They so remain today although
the more rasping edges of the conflict appear somewhat tempered by the war in Viet Nam.
At the same time, the government on the mainland
has not only survived, it has provided China with a
functioning leadership. Under its direction, Chinese
society has achieved a degree of economic and scientific progress, apparently sufficient for survival of
an enormous and growing population and sophisticated enough to produce thermo-nuclear explosions.
In the last two years, the so-called Cultural Revo-

not been found in direct or unilateral violation of
these agreements. It is not impossible that a similar
settlement, with Chinese participation, might be
reached on Viet Nam.
Indeed, it is to be devoutly hoped that there can
be a solution along these lines. Unless it is found,
there is a very real danger-as the Korean experience shows-that the prolongation of war on China's
frontiers may well bring about another United
States-Chinese armed confrontation.

Two Chinas?
Perhaps the most important element in the rebuilding of stable relations with China is to be found in a
solution of the problem of Taiwan. It may help to
come to grips with this issue, if it is understood at the
outset that the island of Taiwan is Chinese. That is
the position of the National Government of the Republic of China. That is the position of the People's
Republic of China. For a quarter of a century, this
common Chinese position has been reinforced by the
policies and actions of the United States government.
Since that is the case, I do not believe that a solution to the Taiwan question is facilitated by its statement in terms of a two-China policy, as has been suggested in some quarters in recent years. The fact is
that there is one China which happens to have been
divided into two parts by events which occurred a
long time ago. Key factors in the maintenance of
peace between the separate segments have been the
interposition of United States military power in the
Taiwan Straits, and the strengthening of the National
Government of China by massive injections of economic and military aid.
This course was followed by the United States for
many reasons, not the least of which was that it made
possible a refuge for dedicated allies and associates in
the war against Japan. Most of all, however, it was
followed because to have permitted the closing of the
breach by a military clash of the two opposing Chinese forces would have meant a massive bloodbath
and, in the end, the rekindling of another great war
in Asia.
However, the situation has changed in the Western
Pacific. Taiwan is no longer abjectly dependent for
its survival on the United States. Some of the passions of the deep Chinese political division have
cooled with the passing of time. Another generation
has appeared and new Chinese societies, in effect,
have grown up on both sides of the Taiwan Straits.
Is there not, then,. some better way to confront this
problem than threat-and-counter-threat between island Chinese and mainland Chinese? Is there not
some better way to live with this situation than by
the armed truce which depends, in the last analysis,
on the continued presence of the United States
Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Straits?
The questions cannot be answered until all involved are prepared to take a fresh look at the situation. It seems to me that it might be helpful if there
could be, among the Chinese themselves, an examination of the possibilities of improving the climate.

As I have already indicated, the proper framework
for any such consideration would be an acceptance
of the contention of both Chinese groups-that there
is only one China and Taiwan is a part of it. In that
context, the questions at issue have to do with the
dichotomous situation as between mainland and island governments and the . possibility of bringing
about constructive changes therein by peaceful
means.
There is no cause to be sanguine about the prospects of an approach of this kind. One can only hope
that time may have helped to ripen the circumstances
for settlement. It is apparent, for example, that the
concept which held the Chinese government on Taiwan to be the sole hope of China's redemption has
grown less relevant with the years. For Taiwan,
therefore, to remain isolated from the mainland is
to court the risk that the island will be left once
again, as it has been on other occasions, in the backwash of Chinese history.
The removal of the wedge of separation, moreover,
would also seem to accord with the interests of the
mainland Chinese government. It does have a
legitimate concern in the reassertion of the historic
connection of Taiwan and China. It does have a concern in ending the hostile division which has been
costly and disruptive both within China and in
China's international relationships.
From the point of view of the United States, too,
there is an interest in seeking a less tenuous situation.
Progress in settling the Taiwan question could contribute to a general relaxation of tensions in the
Western Pacific and, conceivably, even to resolution
of the conflict in Viet Nam. Certainly, it would make
possible a reduction in the enormous and costly overall defense burdens which were assumed in Asian
waters after World War II and which, two decades
later, still rest on the shoulders of this nation.
To sum up, then, it seems to me that the basic adjustment which is needed in policies respecting China
is to make crystal clear that this government does not
anticipate, much less does it seek, the overthrow of
the government of the Chinese mainland. In addition, there is a need to end the discrimination which
consigns China to an inferior status as among the
Communist countries in this nation's policies respecting travel and trade. Finally, it ought to be made
unequivocal that we are prepared at all times to meet
with Chinese representatives-formally or informally-in order to consider differences between China
and the United States over Viet Nam or any other
question of common concern.

A New Start
Adjustments of this kind in the policies of the nation, it seems to me, require above all else a fresh
perspective. We need to see the situation in Asia as it
is today, not as it appeared twenty years ago in the
Himalayan upheaval of the Chinese revolution. We
need to see the situation not through the fog of an
old and stagnant hostility but in the light of the enduring interests of the United States in the Western
Pacific.

of the other Western democracies have, in fact, long
since done regarding their Chinese relationships?

New Approaches to China
I must say that the deepening of the conflict in
Viet Nam makes adjustments in policies respecting
China more difficult. Indeed, the present course of
events in Viet Nam almost insures that there shall
be no changes. It is not easy to contemplate an alleviation with any nation which cheers on those who
are engaged in inflicting casualties on Americans.
Yet, it may well be that this alleviation is an essential aspect of ending the war and, hence, American
casualties. That consideration, alone, it seems to me,
makes initiatives towards China desirable now.
There are several obvious areas in which these
initiatives would have relevance. Discriminatory
restriction on travel to China, for example, is certainly one of these areas. The Chinese may or may
not admit Americans to their country, as they choose.
But it is difficult to understand why our own government should in any way, shape, or form seek to stand
in the way of the attempts of American citizens to
breach the great wall of estrangement between the
two nations. It is, indeed, ironic that during the past
three years there have been more visits of Americans
to North Viet Nam, a nation with which we are at
war, than to China in the past thirteen years.
On the question of travel, it should be recalled that
the Chinese were the first to suggest in 1956 that
American journalists visit China. The suggestion was
summarily rejected by the then Secretary of State.
When, later, it was decided to accept the suggestion,
the Chinese had changed their minds. Since that
time, this nation has been more inclined to ease the
travel barriers, on the basis of official agreement for
exchanges of persons, but the Chinese have shown
no disposition to enter into agreements or, for that
matter, to admit Americans on any basis.
In any event, it seems to me that it is in the positive
interest of this nation to encourage Americans, if
they can gain entry, to travel to China. May I add, I
refer not merely to the travel of selected journalists,
doctors, and other specialists, as is now the policy,
but to the travel of any responsible American. In the
same fashion, it seems to me most appropriate to admit Chinese travelers to the United States under the
same conditions that pertain to visitors from other
Communist countries.
Trade is another area in which long-standing policies respecting China are open to serious question.
Technically, this country still maintains an embargo
on all trade with China. The basis for this policy is
compliance with a voluntary resolution of the United
Nations which was adopted at our behest at the time
of the Korean conflict. It is doubtful that the resolution ever carried much weight among the trading
nations of the world. In any case, it has long since
been forgotten. Today, the principal nations in the
China trade in rough order of importance are the·
United Kingdom, Japan, the Soviet Union, West
Germany, Australia, Canada, Italy and France. Of

all the great maritime nations, the United States
alone clings to a total trade embargo with China.
Moreover, we are also the only nation in the world
which makes an effort to enforce what can best be
described as a kind of secondary boycott of reexported Chinese products.
These policies have had little visible economic impact, but they have had the most serious political
repercussions. It is conceivable that, to the Chinese,
the policies are something of an irritant. To friendly
nations, however, they have been a source of constant
friction. Most serious, their continuance over the
years has injected unnecessary venom into the atmosphere of United States-Chinese relations.
Nor can it be said that the situation in Viet Nam
has compelled the pursuit of the embargo and boycott. The fact is that these restrictions were in place
before most Americans ever heard of Viet Nam, and,
certainly, long before Americans became involved in
the war. If the Vietnamese conflict is now seen as
justification for leaving these policies undisturbed,
what is to be said of the existing attitude toward
trade with other Communist countries?
The fact is that the European Communists are providing North Viet Nam and the Viet Cong with sophisticated military equipment which, from all
reports, exceeds in value the assistance which comes
from China. On what basis, then, is it meaningful to
permit and even to encourage non-strategic trade
with the European Communist countries while holding to a closed-door policy on trade with China?
What constructive purpose is served by the distinction? Any rationalization of relations with China, it
seems to me, will require an adjustment of this dual
approach. We need to move in the direction of equal
treatment of all Communist nations in trade matters,
whatever that treatment may be.
In any event, problems of travel and trade are
secondary obstacles in the development of a more
stable relationship between China and the United
States. There are other far more significant difficulties. I refer, principally, to the question of Taiwan
and to the war in Viet Nam.
There is no doubt that the Chinese government
seeks in Viet Nam a government which is friendly,
if not subservient. Peking has not concealed, moreover, its desire for the withdrawal of American military power from Southeast Asia. It does not follow,
however, that the price of peace in Southeast Asia is
either Chinese domination or U. S. military intervention. That is a black and white oversimplification of
a gray situation. The fact is that neither Burma on
China's border nor Cambodia have been "enslaved"
by China, despite an association of many years, despite periodic difficulties with the great state to the
north and despite an absence of United States support, aid, or protection. These two nations have managed to survive in a state of detachment from the
power rivalries of the region. Furthermore, China is
a signatory to the settlements which emerged from
the Geneva Conferences of 1954 and 1962 and which
contain at least a hope for a middle way to peace in
Indo-China. So far as I am aware, the Chinese have

lution in China has rekindled what has been a
periodic expectation that the Peking government is
on the verge of collapse and the way is open for a
military return to the mainland of the National Government on Taiwan. There seems to be little doubt
that the turmoil in China has caused serious disruptions. What appears in conflict in the cultural revolution, however, is not the Peking structure as such
but the adequacy of its ideological content. That
would be a far cry from the kind of popular revulsion
which might be expected to open the doors to a new
regime.
In any event, the worst of the upheavals within
China appear to have ended months ago, without any
irreparable break in the continuity of the government or the operations of the economy. It is the
height of folly to envision, in the present situation,
an occasion for the overthrow of the Peking government by external military pressures. Indeed, what
would be better calculated to end, overnight, the remaining ferment on the mainland than a plausible
threat to the security of China or an actual attack on
Chinese territory?

Chinese Actions Assessed
If the People's Republic, then, is here to stay, what
of the other assumption on which this nation's policy
respecting China has long been based? What of the
assumption that the Chinese government is an expanding and aggressive force? That it is restrained
from sweeping through Asia because we elected to
meet its challenge along the 17th Parallel which divides the Northern and Southern parts of Viet Nam?
In recent years, the present Chinese government
has not shown any great eagerness to use force to
spread its ideology elsewhere in Asia although Chinese armies have been employed in assertion of the
traditional borders of China. To be sure, China has
given enthusiastic encouragement and p r o mi s e d
support to wars of national liberation. However,
China has not participated directly in these wars and
support, when forthcoming, has been limited and
circumspect.
In Viet Nam, for example, there is certainly Chinese encouragement and aid for the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong. Chinese involvement, however, has been far more peripheral than our own.
The enemy soldiers with whom we are compelled to
grapple are all Vietnamese and, in fact, mostly South
Vietnamese. At every stage of the war, the assistance
we have provided to South Viet Nam has far exceeded the aid from China and from all outside
sources to the Viet Cong and North Viet Nam-both
in terms of men and materiel. There is Chinese
equipment in South Viet Nam but there are no Chinese battalions. Even in North Viet Nam, Chinese
manpower is reported to amount, at most, to onetenth of our forces in Viet Nam, and the great bulk of
these Chinese are labor troops, some involved in airdefense but most of them engaged in repairing bomb ,
damage to roads, railroads, bridges and the like.
Chinese actions in Tibet, and along the Himalayan

frontier of India, are often cited as evidence of militant Chinese Communist aggression. The fact is,
however, that Tibet has been regarded for many decades as falling within China's over-all boundaries.
Not only the Peking government but also the Chinese
National Government on Taiwan insists that Tibet
belongs to China. India also acknowledges such to be
the case. Indeed, American policy has never recognized Tibet as other than Chinese territory.
In the case of the border war with India in 1962,
the Chinese Communists occupied territories which,
again, not only they, but also the Chinese Nationalists, consider to be Chinese. It is not precisely char.:.
acteristic of a militant expansionism, moreover, for a
government to withdraw its military forces from a
territory which they have invested. Yet, the Peking
government did so from parts of India which were
occupied in 1962 as well as from North Korea.
As for indirect aggression through economic means,
China has been able to exert only a limited influence,
either through aid or trade. In Africa and, indeed, in
Southeast Asia, where attempts have been made to
use trade and aid for political ends, the results have
not been conspicuously successful. The fact is that
most of China's trade today rests on a commercialeconomic base. It is carried on largely with the nonCommunist countries, including, may I add, many of
our closest allies.
In short, to speak of China, today, as aggressively
expansionist is to respond to Chinese words rather
than Chinese actions. That is not to say that China
will not pose all manner of threats tomorrow. If
there are not enough nightmares already, consider
the prospects when China's nuclear capabilities will
have been extensively developed, along with a fullfledged intercontinental ballistic missile force.
Of course, there is an immense potential danger in
China, but there is also an immense potential danger
in every other powerful nation in a world which has
not yet learned how to maintain civilized survival
in a nuclear age except on the razor's edge. Insofar
as China is concerned, the fundamental question for
us is not whether it is a danger, real or potential.
The fundamental question is whether our present
policies act to alleviate or to exacerbate the danger.
Do we forestall the danger by jousting with the shadows and suspicions of the past? Do we help by a
continuance in policies which do little if anything to
lift the heavy curtain of mutual ignorance and hostility?
Like it or not, the present Chinese government is
here to stay. Like it or not, China is a major power
in Asia and is on the way to becoming a nuclear
power. Is it, therefore, in this nation's interest and in
the interest of world peace to put aside, once and for
all, what have been the persistent but futile attempts
to isolate China? Is it, therefore, in this nation's
interest and in the interest of world peace to try
conscientiously and consistently to do whatever we
can do-and, admittedly, it is not much-to reshape
the relationship with the Chinese along more constructive and stable lines? In short, is it propitious
for this nation to try to do what the policies of most

In this context we will better be able to find appropriate responses at appropriate times to the specific
problems of the Sino-United States relationship,
whether they have to do with United Nations representation or diplomatic recognition or the off-shore
islands : ·or' Whatever. \,:Withol!t ;,prior adjustment in
perspective,. h6weyer,·. tO seek to deal definitively
with these questfo:hs ·w.buld be, to say the least, an
exercise in futility.
I should emphasize :. b~~ore concluding that it is
unlikely that there will be any eager Chinese responses to:initiatives on gur. part. Nevertheless, I see
nothing to be lost for this nation in trying to move
along the lines which have been suggested. Chinese
intransigence is no license for American intransigence. Our stake in the situation in the Western Pacific is too large for that sort of infantile indulgence.
I see great relevance in thinking deeply of the issues which divide China and the United States to see
if they can be recast in new and uncluttered molds.
There is every reason, especially for young people,
to examine most closely the premises of policy regarding China which were enshrined almost two
decades ago. The fact is that the breakdown in Chinese-United States relations was one of the great failures of my generation and it is highly doubtful that
its full repair shall be seen in my lifetime. The
problem, therefore, will fall largely to you. It is not
a particularly happy inheritance, but there is reason
to hope that it may fare better in your hands.
Unlike my generation, you know more about Asia.
You have a greater awareness of its importance to
this nation and to the world. You have not had the
experience of national trauma in moving abruptly
from an era marked by an almost fawning benevolence toward China to one of thorough disenchantment. You were spared the fierce hostilities which
rent this nation internally, as a sense of warmth,
sympathy and security regarding China gave way to
feelings of revulsion, hatred and insecurity.
Your Chinese counterparts, the young people of

today's China-they are called the "Heirs of the Revolution"-have a similar gap to bridge as they look
across the Pacific. Your generation in China, too, has
been contained and isolated, and its view of the
United States has been colored with the hates of
another time. It has had no contact with you or, indeed, with much of the world outside China.
On the other hand, those young people have grown
up under easier conditions than the older generation
of Chinese who lived their youth in years of continuous war and revolution. It may be that they can face
you and the rest of the world with greater equanimity and assurance than has been the case at any
time in modern Chinese history.
I urge you to think for yourselves about China. I
urge you to approach, with a new objectivity, that
vast nation, with its great population of industrious
and intelligent people. Bear in mind that the peace
of Asia and the world will depend on China :;i.s much
as it does on this nation, the Soviet Union, or any
other, not because Chinese is Communist but because
China is China-among the largest countries in the
world and the most populous.
Mao Tse-Tung remarked in an interview several
years ago that "future events would be decided by
future generations." Insofar as his words involve the
relationship of this nation and China, whether they
prove to be a prophecy of doom or a forecast of a
happier future will depend not so much on us, the
"Old China Hands" of yesterday, but on you, the
"New American Hands" of tomorrow.
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